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ABSTRACT 
While the participation of NGOs in international institutions has been extensively researched by 
constructivist theory and legal scholarship, many of the researches have been limited to the 
examination of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs. The rather puzzling variation in NGO participation in 
the European and Inter-American Human Rights System can therefore not be explained by existing 
theories. While the European Human Rights System follows its initial institutional design of limited 
NGO participation, the Inter-American System has been confronted with more NGO involvement over 
the last decades, even though the institutional designs of the systems are similar. This thesis tries to 
answer the question what could explain this variation by looking at the structural differences of the 
level of autonomy and the resources of the institutions. The NGO participatory roles of (1) lobbying 
for greater support for the institutions among member states, or lobbying for reform at the Court on 
behalf of the member states; (2) providing assistance in investigations; and (3) as amicus curiae are 
examined. It is concluded that the low level of autonomy and poor resources of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System have created many participatory opportunities for NGOs. Similarly, the high 
level of autonomy of the European Human Rights System has created little opportunities for NGOs to 
participation. However, the level of resources of the European System is not sufficient to deal with its 
workload, but this has not created many opportunities for NGOs. Further research is required to 
provide a more extensive image of what explains the variation in NGO participation in the regional 
human rights systems.   
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Introduction  
The traumas of the Second World War initiated the creation of a universal document specifying the 
rights to which individuals are inherently entitled. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which has since served as a blueprint for 
international treaties and human rights instruments. It was considered to be the first global expression 
of human rights and it has assisted to create a universal human rights system which is, in theory, 
accessible to all individuals around the world. Over the past decades, regional human right systems 
have been created to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights in specific parts of the 
world. Currently, 68 states are subject to the decisions of the two major established regional human 
rights systems, which both aim to safeguard against repetitions of mass-scale human rights abuses
1
. 
The European and Inter-American Human Rights Systems are the two major regional human rights 
organs and are both part of regional integration systems which have a broader mandate than solely the 
protection of human rights – for the Inter-American human rights system, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) carries its mandate; the European system is part of the Council of Europe 
(CoE). The systems are most-similar: they have comparable initial institutional designs, they both 
have treaty-based courts and they were both set up in similar historical periods. The threat of 
communism in Eastern Europe provoked the creation of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in 1959, while the establishment of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) was triggered by the Cuban revolution and the dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. 
While universal human rights institutions face the challenge of advancing human rights in states that 
may resist supranational institutions and decisions, regional human rights systems have managed to 
circumvent this challenge by being an enforcement mechanism which can resonate better with local 
conditions than global, universal systems.  
With an increasingly important role for civil society in the international political arena, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have become essential in the advancement of human rights 
norms. Today they are well known actors in the development and implementation of international 
human rights law and they can pressure for large-scale changes in international norms and standards. 
Santivasa, in her research on the role of NGOs at the International Court of Justice, states that “… 
their [NGOs] contribution to the development of international law is undeniably remarkable. Over the 
past decades, international NGOs are increasingly taking part in various steps of the legal order, such 
as elaboration of rules, law enforcement and litigation” 2. Extensive research has been conducted over 
                                                     
1
 Cavallaro, J.L. and Brewer, S.E. (2008). Never Again? The Legacy of the Argentine and Chilean Dictatorship 
for the Global Human Rights Regime. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 39(2): 233-244, p. 238 (hereinafter 
Cavallaro and Brewer 2008) 
2
 Santivasa, S. (2012). The NGOs Participation in the Proceedings of the International Court of Justice. Journal 
of East Asia & International Law, 5(2): 377-406, p. 378 (hereinafter Santivasa 2012) 
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the past decades to explore the increasingly important role that NGOs can play in international 
institutions.  
While research on the influence of NGOs has been extensive, research on the participation of NGOs 
specifically in regional human rights systems has been limitedly extended beyond the norm emergence 
phase. This can to some extend be explained by the nature of the regional human rights systems: the 
initial (legal) institutional design of both the European and Inter-American human rights system limits 
and even excludes NGOs from participating. The early exclusion of NGOs is not unexpected as they 
were not yet major global actors at the time of the creation of the regional human rights systems. 
However, while NGOs have more and more become important global actors, the development of NGO 
participation within the systems has not equally evolved. Today, NGO participation at the European 
Court of Human Rights follows its initial institutional design with limited formal NGO participation – 
only four percent of the decisions on the merits had direct NGO involvement in the role of a NGO 
acting as a representative
3
. Contrastingly, the frequency of participation of NGOs in the Inter-
American system is much greater: over half of the decisions involved direct NGO participation
4
. Even 
though there is no measurement that allows to specifically determine the numbers on the informal 
participation of NGOs, reports from major human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights reflect that, over the last decades, their activities have been more frequent in the 
Americas than in Europe
5
. 
The difference in NGO participation seems to be puzzling: the European human rights system is 
considered to be the strongest regional human rights system. It would therefore be a perfect venue for 
NGOs to further their goals: its institutions are stable and the member states are willing to cooperate in 
order to protect and promote human rights. Additionally, with the adoption of Protocol 11
6
, NGOs are 
now allowed to formally participate in the European System. Contrastingly, the less developed Inter-
American Human Rights System could incite NGOs to utilize a different mechanism. Furthermore, the 
system has not changed the venues for NGO participation since the last amendment of the Rules of the 
                                                     
3
 Mayer, L. (2011). NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts and Commissions. Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, 36(3): 911-946, p. 923 (hereinafter Mayer 2011) 
4
 Id., p. 923 
5
 While the formal participation of NGOs in the regional human rights system is easily measurable, the 
measurement of informal participation is dependent on the reports of the human rights institutions and human 
rights NGOs. However, as the major global human rights NGOs participate in both regional systems, it has been 
derived from their annual reports that their participation is more frequent in the Inter-American System. Taking 
this as a starting point, this research will step-by-step examine to what extent which participatory roles vary 
among the regional systems. Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2014/2015: The State of the 
World‟s Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/; Human 
Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Events of 2012. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf 
6
 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 
1994, E.T.S. No. 155 (hereinafter Protocol 11) 
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Commission in the 1965
7
. Additionally, there is a similarity among the regional human rights systems 
that could influence the participation of NGOs: the number of cases filed at the ECtHR and IACHR do 
not greatly differ, thus not creating any incentives for NGOs to participate in the system that faces 
most human rights abuses. This research will further examine the variation by aiming to answer the 
following question: What explains the variation across the European and Inter-American Human 
Rights Systems as to the participation of NGOs?  
In order to answer this question, I will first establish the participatory roles that NGOs can play. This 
will be followed by an examination of the current literature on NGO participation in order to 
determine whether there is a theory that can help explain the variation. As previously stated, the 
research on NGO participation in regional human rights systems seems to limitedly extend beyond the 
norm emergence phase. After examining constructivist and legal scholarship theories, it can be 
concluded that there is no theory that can explain the variation. However, a first insight in the variation 
is provided by the conclusion of Scholte‟s research that institutional structures are important to NGO 
participation
8
.  
The lack of a readily available explanation to the variation in NGO participation the importance of this 
research: there is little existing literature on the participation of NGOs at regional human rights 
systems beyond norm emergence. This research will contribute to theory building by examining 
whether the structural differences of the autonomy and resources of the institutions are important 
indicators for the level of NGO participation in the regional human rights systems. The concepts of 
institutional autonomy and resources will be further operationalized in the theoretical framework.   
The operationalization of the concepts will be followed by an examination of the regional human 
rights systems. Both the European and Inter-American Human Rights system will be examined by 
further going into detail on the workings of the institutions and the possibilities for NGOs to 
participate formally. An analysis of the autonomy and resources of both systems will then be provided, 
which both will be linked to the participatory roles that NGOs can play. This will be done by looking 
at the participatory roles of lobbying for reform, providing assistance to the institutions and the filing 
of amicus curiae briefs.  
It will be concluded that both the level of autonomy and resources have an influence on the 
participatory role of NGOs. The Inter-American Human Rights System has dealt with a lack of 
autonomy since its creation and that is reflected in the important role that NGOs play in the reform 
process. The independence of the European System is better respected by its member states, which 
leaves little possibilities for NGOs to provide assistance. The effects of resources on the participation 
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States: A Case Study. American University Law Review, 9(1): 95-115, p. 96 (hereinafter Padilla 1993) 
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of NGOs are not as straightforward as the effects of the level of autonomy. While both the European 
and Inter-American System have been dealing with lacking funds, the role of NGOs is far more 
apparent in the Inter-American System. The possibilities for NGOs related to the lack of resources to 
the ECtHR are limited as the European member states want to preserve the independence of the Court 
and therefore deal with the lack of funding in a more regulated manner.  
This research will have its limitations. There is no database from which data on the participation of 
NGOs in the human rights systems can be collected. The data therefore needs to be collected from 
reports issued by major human rights NGOs and the regional systems. In order to verify the gathered 
information, I will interview representatives of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Directorate Western Hemisphere). For pragmatic reasons, I will 
not be able to interview the number of people in order to be able to draw conclusions from their 
statements. It will, however, allow me to confirm the facts previously established. Additionally, even 
though the regional human rights systems are similar on most parts, the major difference lies in the 
dual-structure of the Inter-American System. While individuals can file their complaints directly at the 
ECtHR, they have to go through the Commission at the Inter-American system. This influences the 
possibilities for the participation of NGOs. I believe however that this will not create any difficulties 
for this research: the ECtHR has largely taken over the task of the European Commission on Human 
Rights and therefore now receives all complaints, which leaves only one institution for NGOs to 
participate at. Furthermore, I am aware that domestic factors can influence the decisions that member 
states make concerning their international obligations. However, as this research focuses on the 
autonomy and resources of the institutions, rather than why this level differs among the systems, I do 
believe that this will not limit me to draw any conclusions on the variation in NGO participation.  
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Framework of analysis 
Before being able to determine what causes the participatory role of NGOs to vary among the regional 
human rights systems, the participatory roles of NGOs need to be established. The formal role of filing 
amicus curiae
9
 briefs is restricted or promoted by the statutes of the Commission and the Courts and 
would therefore be too limited to only consider.  
According to Haddad
10
, five different roles for NGOs can be distinguished: (1) formal roles in trials; 
(2) advisory roles; (3) representative roles; (4) providing information; and (5) operational support 
roles. There is no readily available database with data on these participatory roles at the regional 
human rights systems. Researches done on NGO participation
11
 have been conducted through the 
extensive process of collecting data by going through all the decisions made by the Courts and all the 
documents filed by (major) NGOs. This process is fairly time-consuming and since not all roles have 
been as extensively researched by scholars to provide all the data for this research, I will limit myself 
to the following three participatory roles:   
1. Lobbying for greater support for the institutions among member states, or lobbying for reform 
at the Court on behalf of the member states 
2. Providing assistance in investigations  
3. As amicus curiae 
 
Theories on NGO Participation 
An overview of the existing literature on NGO participation will be provided. Following the 
examination of the literature of constructivism and legal scholarship, it can be concluded that there is 
no theory that explains the variation in participation. Scholte‟s research suggests that institutional 
structures are an important indicator to NGO participation
12
. However, the institutional structures 
influencing the participation of NGOs for the regional human rights systems are not examined and 
therefore still need to be established. 
                                                     
9
 An amicus curiae (friend of the court) is a person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court is 
requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that person has strong interests in the subject matter  
10
 Haddad, H.N. (2012). Judicial Institution Builders: NGOs and International Human Rights Courts. Journal of 
Human Rights, 11(1): 126-149 (hereinafter Haddad 2012) 
11
 Mayer 2011, supra note 3; Mohammed, A. (1999). Individual and NGO participation in Human Rights 
Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples‟ Rights: Lessons From the European and Inter-
American Court. Journal of African Law, 43(2): 201-213 (hereinafter Mohammed 1999); Wilkowska-
Landowska, A. (2006). „Friends of the Court‟: The Role of Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisations in 
the Litigation Process. Human Rights Law Commentary, 2: 99-119 
12
 Scholte 2013, supra note 8 
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Constructivism 
The international relations theory of constructivism views the course of international relations as an 
interactive process in which the ideas of and communications among agents serve to create structures. 
The created structures, in turn, influence the ideas and communications of the agents. Most important 
for the research of NGO participation is that constructivism sees, in contrast to realism, not only states 
as key actors in world politics. They believe that NGOs and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) 
are equally important and that an international political arena exists outside of states
13
. Constructivist 
theory focuses both on Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and NGOs.  
Finnemore and Sikkink have defined NGOs as agenda setters, democratic difference makers and 
promoters of new norms
14
. In this respect, NGOs can either preserve or alter the status quo and can be 
found to operate interdependently with the core organizations of global governance, e.g. the regional 
human rights courts. While their conducted research reflects the importance of NGOs in international 
politics, it does not sufficiently demonstrate the reciprocal relationship that NGOs and international 
courts can have. Additionally, they do not go into detail on NGO participation on the operational side 
of international institutions – it is solely focused on NGOs as norm entrepreneurs. 
The introduction of the spiral model by Risse and Sikkink
15
 also demonstrates the tendency to classify 
NGOs as norm entrepreneurs. In this model, NGOs are given a central role in the process of human 
rights norm creation, alongside individuals, states and international organizations. This research 
likewise solely focuses on the norm emergence phase of the institutions. Even though it cannot be 
stated that each and every human right is universally accepted and respected by all signatories to 
human rights conventions, the norm emergence phase of the creation of the regional human rights 
institutions has ended. The pressure for norm creation at the institutions is therefore no longer needed. 
NGOs can now extend their influence to the operational side and this research should therefore be 
extended. 
This extension of the research has in part been done by Keck and Sikkink, who have identified 
circumstances under which NGOs can exercise influence on international institutions: (1) issue 
creation; (2) influence on discursive positions; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence 
on policy change; and (5) influence on state behavior
16
. These areas of influence are similar to the 
participatory roles that will be examined in this thesis: lobbying for support and providing assistance 
to the institutions are related to the influence on policy change in „target actors‟ and influence on 
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 Slaughter, A. (2011). International Relations, Principal Theories. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
14
 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International 
Organization, 52(4): 887-917, p. 890 
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 Risse, T, Ropp, S, and Sikkink, K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic 
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
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institutional procedures. While this classification shows that constructivist research on NGOs is 
extending beyond the phase of norm creation, it does not provide any further explanation to why these 
possibilities are utilized differently in the various human rights systems.  
The varying strategies towards the adoption of sanctions have been researched by Klotz. She examined 
the sanctions adopted by international institutions against the apartheid regime, which have 
contradicted the strategic and economic interest of some. She concludes that the emergence of the 
norm of „racial equality‟, triggered by NGO pressure, forced IOs to change their views17. This research 
shows that norms can play a role that is equally important as strategic concerns in policy formulation 
and it confirms the importance of NGOs at the norm emergence stage. However, is lacks the next step 
by not explaining why the norms varied among the institutions in addition to the explanation to what 
triggered the acceptance of norms at some IOs. 
Further research on the influence of TANs on the creation of institutions has also been researched has 
been done by Struett. He explored the impact of TANs on the creation of the International Criminal 
Court and argued that TANs played an important role in shaping the key provisions in the Court‟s 
statute and in achieving quick ratification of the Statute
18
. He concludes that TANs were able to 
achieve this predominantly through the use of arguments, implying that argumentation is one of the 
most powerful tools of participation for TANs
19
. This argument is further supported in Haddad‟s 
research on the norm emergence of the prosecution of sex crimes at the Rwandan and Yugoslav 
tribunals
20
. In this research she concludes that TANs helped to general the necessary political will to 
adopt and implement legal norms regarding the crimes of sexual violence at both tribunals.  
Focusing more specifically on institutions that are already in force, Kelly researched the influence of 
TANs on IGOs and concluded that the effects of their pressure should not be taken as a given
21
.
 
While 
the World Bank responds functionally to NGO pressure, the IMF responds defensively and therewith 
marginalizes the effects of NGO pressure. This variation in civil society participation is further 
confirmed by Scholte who researched why financial markets have attracted relatively little effective 
civil society mobilization
22
. He has attributed the lack of civil society participation in the IMF to the 
secrecy of the financial sector, the public ignorance of financial capital and its governance and the low 
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 Klotz, A. (1995). Norms Reconstructing Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South 
Africa. International Organization, 49(3): 451-478, p. 476 
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 Struett, Michael J. (2008). The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, 
and Agency. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 85 
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 Id. p. 86 
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 Haddad, H.N (2011). Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
Tribunals. Human Rights Review, 12(1): 109-132 
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22
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11 
 
institutional capacity for mutual engagement
23
. He concludes that the organizational structures 
negatively influence the possibilities for civil society participation, which provides a starting point for 
the examination of NGO participation in this research.   
While these studies go further than previous research by looking at the participation of NGOs beyond 
the norm emergence phase, there is no clear explanation provided to why the participation of NGOs 
could potentially differ among the regional human rights institutions. The specificity of the researches 
does not allow inducting conclusions to the broader relational patterns between international courts 
and NGOs: how the relationships have formed over time and how NGOs can influence the operational 
side of international courts. However, it does provide the starting point of looking at the structures of 
the institutions to find an explanation.  
Legal Scholarship 
Legal scholarship more directly acknowledges the possibilities for NGO participation at international 
courts. However, it limits itself to the formal roles associated with representing victims as a party or as 
a third-party participant. NGOs often do not have legal standing as claimants at international courts 
and are considered to be non-legal actors. Legal advocates of NGO participation view NGOs as 
stakeholders in the international judicial process while at the same time being a potentially 
legitimizing and democratizing influence at the institution
24
. On the other hand, skeptics argue that 
NGOs are not democratic organizations and should therefore not be characterized as legitimate 
participating organizations
25
.  
While the participation of NGOs at international courts is often only studied regarding the creation of 
the norms and institutions, social movement theory examines NGO participation at constitutional and 
domestic courts. One of the main focuses of research in this field is the study of the benefits of using 
courts as a means to advance civil or human rights claims. While constitutional courts are criticized by 
many on the grounds that they offer „hollow hope‟ for civil rights26, some scholars have argued in 
favor of the utilization of constitutional courts. The emerging work in comparative politics that 
questions what benefits courts may receive in return for allowing NGO participation could be helpful 
for the examination of the variation of NGO participation. Moustafa
27
 argues, by examining the 
Egyptian Constitutional Court, that domestic courts and civil society groups are in a symbiotic 
relationship whereby the court provides an opportunity for NGOs to challenge the state. In return, civil 
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 Lindblom, A. (2005). Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
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of Chicago Press 
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society provides the court services, which includes monitoring, initiating litigation, and documenting 
violations. These findings could be an initial step in explaining the variation in NGO participation. 
The Egyptian Court and NGOs seem to cooperate to be able to form a front against the undemocratic 
Egyptian regime. This reciprocal relationship should then be more apparent in a region with less 
mature democratic states, from which it could be argued that NGO participation in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System should be greater than in the European System. However, as these findings are 
mainly focused on the domestic conditions of the states rather than the conditions at the institutions, it 
will not be provided as an explanation to the variation in NGO participation. Furthermore, it needs to 
be kept in mind that the dynamics of the constitutional courts differ greatly from the international 
courts. International courts are supranational institutions, often having to deal with struggles 
concerning the enforceability of their decisions
28
. The need for NGO support is of a different nature 
than in a domestic court which could lead to different forms participation. While the findings of 
Moustafa support the variation in NGO participation, the research needs to be extended towards the 
variations in the institutions rather than the domestic nature of the member states.  
Legal scholarship acknowledges that NGOs can and do participate at international courts beyond their 
formal involvement in litigation. They participate at the international courts by providing services such 
as information sharing and administrative support
29
. However, the conducted research is limited to 
establishing the fact that there are roles that NGOs can play, not aiming to provide any explanation to 
how these roles emerge and when NGOs get involved. The research done by legal scholarship on the 
formal participatory role of NGOs both in international and domestic courts is therefore too limited to 
draw conclusions on the variation in participatory roles.  
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Theoretical Framework 
The participation of NGOs has been extensively researched: scholars have examined the presence of 
NGOs at international institutions, domestic courts, international tribunals and the UN. All research 
shows that NGOs can be of importance in the emergence of norms and the creation of institutions. The 
conducted research considers the NGO to be the central actor, examining why they participate and 
how far their influence extends. However, the aim of this research is to focus on the opportunities that 
are created within the institutions, while taking the willingness and resources of the NGOs as a given. 
The institutional design, the nature of the cases heard, and the time-frame of the creation of the 
institutions is similar in both systems and can therefore not be the variable that explains the variation 
in NGO participation.  
Two major differences exist between the regional human rights systems: the support for the 
institutions and the funding it receives. Taking into consideration the three participatory roles that will 
be examined – lobbying for greater support, providing assistance and acting as amicus curiae – these 
structural differences could be an explanation to why these participatory roles of NGOs vary among 
the regional systems. I will now further argue why resources and autonomy are important to the 
functioning of the institutions, and therewith the creation of opportunities for NGOs to participate.  
Autonomy of the institution 
The autonomy of an institution is the degree to which the member states respect its independence. This 
can be negatively influenced by states that threaten the institution, through withdrawal of support from 
the human rights treaty or by not complying with judicial decisions. These threats can create 
opportunities for NGOs to provide assistance to either the institution or the member state to lobby for 
reforms. Following international organization literature that focuses on the relationship between 
member states and courts
30
 I argue that institutional autonomy matters for the level of participation of 
NGOs. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The lack of autonomy of a regional human rights institution leads to more NGO 
participation in the form of lobbying for reform or lobbying for greater support 
In order to determine whether the autonomy indeed influences the participatory role of NGOs, I will 
first establish the autonomy of the Courts and the Commission. To determine the relative support for 
the human rights institutions, I will first look at the number of signatories to the Conventions 
compared to the number of members to the parent-organizations. However, as research has established 
that the ratification of a human rights treaty is often used as an ideal response to criticism about a 
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state‟s human rights practices31, this will not be provide reliable information on the actual support of 
the member states to the institution. States with bad human rights records can ratify for the level of 
external legitimation by following „global scripts‟32, rather than to fully commit to the treaty. To 
measure the autonomy of the institutions I will therefore examine the following indicators: (1) the 
nature of the reservations made with the ratification of the Conventions; (2) the number of 
denunciations and threats of withdrawal; and (3) the level of compliance with the judgments issued by 
the institutions.  
First, I will look at the reservations that have been made to the Conventions– do they undermine the 
independence of the institutions? A reservation may “anticipate the extent to which the Contracting 
Party is going to apply the conventional obligations”33, and therewith respect the autonomy of the 
institution. The types of reservations therefore provide more information on the intentions of the 
member states than their mere ratification. For the Inter-American System it will also be important to 
look at the recognition of jurisdiction of the Court, as this needs to be explicitly done.  
The second step in determining the autonomy of the regional human rights system will be to look at 
the threats of withdrawal and the denunciations made by member states. This indicator will 
specifically look at the official denunciations filed with either the CoE or the OAS and the official 
threats that states have made to withdraw. These threats are counted through the official state 
declarations on a threat of withdrawal and supporting press releases and newspaper articles. The third 
step to determine the autonomy of the regional human rights system will be the examination of the 
compliance rate within the regional systems. As stated before, some states may only ratify the 
Convention for the benefits, with no intention to comply. The commitment of states to comply with 
the rulings issued by the institutions is crucial to the integrity of any legal system, both domestic and 
international as it carries a large normative priority
34
. The compliance rate thus provides a good 
indication of the respect of member states to the institutions. As the overall level of compliance with 
the system needs to be determined, I will not go into detail on the compliance rate of every member 
state. I will however provide more information on the biggest threats to the autonomy concerning 
compliance.  
If the autonomy of the institutions indeed appears to be low at either one of the systems, I will look at 
the opportunities that emerge for NGOs. To be able to determine whether the level of autonomy 
indeed has an influence, I examine whether NGOs participate in the following roles: (1) lobby for 
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more support for the institutions; (2) lobby for reform of the institutions on behalf of the member 
states; (3) assistance in investigations; and (4) the filing of amicus curiae briefs. 
First, lobbying for support can refer to the lobby for retracting of reservations, to urging member states 
to sign the Convention and to urging states to comply with the judgments of the institutions. The 
required information will be attained from the annual reports of the major human rights NGOs and the 
country reports that they have issued. Additionally, I will consider newspaper articles that have been 
published concerning the threats of member states to the institutions. The second participatory role 
that will be examined is the lobby for reform. This can be for the interests of either side of the reform 
process. The assistance of NGOs will be measured by looking at the filing of joint NGO statements, 
their recommendations in the reform process, and their attendance in reform deliberations.  
Third, the assistance in investigations will be examined. While this participatory role is largely related 
to the resources of the institution, the level of autonomy can have an influence on the initial stages of 
investigations. The respect for the independence of the Court from the member states is an important 
indicator for the relationship of trust between the institutions and the High Contracting Parties. 
Mistrust from the institution to its member states is increased if the independence of the institution is 
not respected
35
. The lack of trust can influence the acceptance of previously domestically established 
facts in cases that are brought before the Commission or Court. If the autonomy of the institutions is 
high, the likelihood that it will accept the established facts in cases is bigger. The acceptance of the 
facts will reduce the investigative burden for the Court or Commission and therewith reduce the 
opportunities for NGOs to participate. Fourth, the filing of amicus briefs can increase if the autonomy 
of the institutions is low. NGOs may feel more called to file the briefs to make sure that the trial is fair 
and all information is provided to the institutions, as member states may feel less called to take the 
responsibility if they do not fully support the institutions.  
Resources of the institution 
The resources of the institution refer to the financial support it receives from the parent organization. 
To be able to function adequately and effectively, the institutions require proper funding to finance 
both the legal processes and the administrative apparatus. As the member states have to approve the 
budgets of the OAS and the CoE, the funds of the institutions can be negatively influenced by the 
states against which complaints are filed. If member states feel threatened by the complaints filed 
against them, they could intend to undermine the effectiveness of the institution by opposing the 
proposed budget
36
. A well-funded institution can function more effectively than an under-funded one
37
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and the less-functioning human rights institution could create opportunities for NGOs to provide 
assistance in investigations and administrations that are otherwise under-funded. I therefore argue that 
the funds of the regional human rights systems are important to the level of NGO participation.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: The lack of funding for the human rights institutions leads to more NGO 
participation through the provision of investigative and monetary assistance 
To determine the level of resources of the institutions, I will examine the following indicators: (1) the 
overall budget; (2) the allocation of the resources; and (3) availability of legal aid assistance. To start, 
the overall budget over the last two decades will be analyzed. The most important information that can 
be derived from this is whether the budgets of the institutions have increased along the increase in the 
workload of the Courts and the Commission. The budgets will be displayed in euros, which will for 
the Inter-American system be calculated from its exchange rate to dollars at the time of the issuing of 
the budget. However, the determination of the total budget provides little information on the efficiency 
of the allocation of the resources. The effective functioning of the court is dependent on the 
administrative apparatus and a well-funded legal process, which can be accomplished with smaller 
resources as well. Therefore, I will secondly look at the allocation of the budget. The legal processes 
and administrative apparatus need to be adequately funded – this is where NGOs can step in and 
provide assistance. To determine whether the allocation of the budgets is effective, I will look at which 
areas are underfunded. As both regional human rights systems do not provide specific budgets of their 
human rights organs, I will derive this information from the statements of both the institutions and 
member states on the necessary increase of budgets. Both the institutions and member states have 
called for the reform of the funding system and have specified the resources required for the 
institutions to function adequately.  
Thirdly, I will consider the availability of legal aid for individuals filing a complaint. Both systems 
provide financial and legal aid, but the effectiveness is not guaranteed. If the resources available for 
legal assistance are not sufficient to cover the costs of the legislation of those individuals in need, 
NGOs can provide the necessary legal assistance. This will be measured by looking at the number of 
cases in which NGOs have functioned as a representative for an individual.  
If the allocation of the budgets appears to suggest that the institutions are under-funded, I will 
determine whether NGOs have filled this gap. The following participation of NGO will be considered: 
(1) NGO participation in conducting investigative legwork; (2) providing monetary assistance to the 
institutions; and (3) filing of amicus curiae briefs.  
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First, the participatory role of providing assistance will be looked at through the participation of NGOs 
in conducting investigative legwork. If the institutions lack the resources to conduct investigations 
necessary to report on human rights abuses occurring in a member state, NGOs can provide assistance 
through conducting their own investigations. This will be through country visits, assistance in on-site 
visits and the composition of country and annual reports.  
Second, I will consider the direct monetary contributions that NGOs make. To be able to establish 
whether the quest for external funding has increased NGO participation, it is important to consider 
whether the additional resources were directly located to the institutions. If the NGO funding is 
allocated towards the parent organization, it will not be considered as NGO participation at the 
regional human rights system. Additionally, I will consider whether this external funding has been 
provided upon request of the institutions – through this, the institutions confirm their own lack of 
resources. Third, I will consider the participatory role of amicus curiae at the regional courts. An 
increase in the filing of these briefs can be explained by the lack of resources. Following the reasoning 
on the operation support of the NGOs to the court, the lack of funding to conduct proper research may 
instigate NGOs to step in and provide that information through the formal route. This will both be at 
the request of the institutions and providing time and resource costly comparative law studies. 
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The European Human Rights System 
In a desire to protect themselves from the horrors of the Second World War, the countries of Western 
Europe agreed to establish the CoE in 1949. The Council‟s tasks are succinctly explained in the 
Convention‟s preamble: “to promote the signatories belief in individual freedom, political liberty and 
the Rule of Law”38. To achieve this goal, the CoE created a system for the guarantee of the human 
rights in Europe. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“European Convention”) was signed in 1950 and came into force in 1953. Even though the 
Convention included the creation of the Commission and the Court to monitor and enforce the human 
rights, it was initially a symbolic document aiming to preserve and safeguard the values of Western 
Europe
39
. 
The entry into force of the European Convention was followed by the creation of the European 
Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1954 and the ECtHR in 1959. During the first forty years, it 
continued to function with this dual-institutional structure: on the basis of a Commission having quasi-
judicial functions and a non-permanent Court. The eleventh Protocol of the Convention
40
 changed the 
structure of the system by giving the Court a permanent character and abolishing the Commission. 
Any individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of a human right enshrined in the Convention can 
now directly lodge a complaint against a member state at the ECtHR
41
.  
NGO Participation in the European Human Rights System 
NGOs were not prominent global players when the European Convention was drafted. While NGOs 
did exist, their numbers were small and their impact was limited, which was due to Cold War politics 
and a weak status at the UN
42
. The number of NGOs began to rapidly grow in the 1970s and the count 
of human rights NGOs has grown from fifty in the 1940s to over four-hundred in the early 2000s
43
.  
At the time of the creation of the European institutions, individuals and private groups did not have the 
right to appear before the Court. They were able to, with the agreement of the member state 
concerned, to file their complaints with the ECHR and if the Commission deemed the complaint 
admissible and irresolvable by friendly settlement, the Commission could refer the case to the Court. 
However, even in instances where the Commission brought the cases before the Court, the 
Commission was the party before the ECtHR, and not the individual or the group that had filed the 
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complaint
44
. The initial institutional design of the European system strongly confirmed the member 
states as the main protectors of human rights and left little possibilities for NGOs to participate.  
From 1989 onward, individuals and groups were given the possibility to ask the President of the Court 
for the opportunity to intervene in any given case
45
. Additionally, the Court slowly evolved to permit 
non-state participation into its proceedings through the filing of amicus curiae briefs
46
. The adoption 
of Protocol 11 had the biggest influence on the procedures as it expanded the entities that have the 
possibility to bring a case before the Court. The European Convention was amended to provide that 
“the Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of 
individual claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights 
set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto”47. An NGO claiming to be a victim needs to meet 
the threshold requirements, such as exhausting all domestic remedies and being the personal victim of 
the violated rights. 
Recently, the ECtHR has developed towards allowing NGOs to file a complaint on behalf of an 
individual who is not capable of doing so him or her-self. In the case of Center for Legal Resources on 
Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania
48
, the Center For Legal Resources filed a complaint on 
behalf of an individual with disabilities in whose case there was no one else to seek justice. Even 
though this is too recent of a development to be examined in the participatory roles of NGOs in this 
research, it does confirm that the acceptance of NGOs at the ECtHR is an ongoing process.  
Autonomy and NGO participation 
The development of the European Human Rights System occurred within Western European countries 
that were like-minded when it came to the protection of liberal values. Even though the initial 
symbolic character of the European Convention created a calm and supportive climate, the system was 
at first characterized by limited institutional autonomy
49
. Not all contracting states were willing to 
fully accept the Commission and the Court. Resulting from a disbelief in supranational control 
mechanisms concerning public freedom, France was hesitant to fully commit to the Convention. It did 
not accept the jurisdiction of the Court until 1974 when it ratified the Convention and it waited until 
                                                     
44
 Simpson 2004, supra note 39 
45
 European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court A, art. 37 (2) 
46
 Eynde, v.d, L. (2013). An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights NGOs Before the 
European Court of Human Rights. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 31(3): 271-313, p. 274 
47
 Protocol 11, supra note 6, art. 34 
48
 Center for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania, (App no. 47848/08) ECHR 17 July 
2014. Retrieved from http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145577 
49
 Madsen, M. (2007). From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of Human 
Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics. Law and Social Inquiry 32(1): 137 – 
159, p. 138 (hereinafter Madsen 2007) 
20 
 
1981 to declare that French citizens could directly apply to the ECtHR. Greece waited respectively 
until 1979 and 1985, while Turkey was the last state to approve both in 1990 and 1987
50
. 
The first decades of the Commission and the Court were marked by „negotiated justice‟ rather than a 
universal commitment: the Commission rarely found the filing of complaints to be admissible, the 
friendly settlements that were produced were not publicly denounced and many reports were kept 
behind closed doors until 1998
51
. In the 1990s, the challenge to improve the autonomy was taken up 
by the member states and the institutions. With the creation of the permanent ECtHR as the sole 
protector of human rights in Europe, the European system was no longer a significant threat to the 
domestic laws concerning the security of human rights and justice
52
. The ECtHR was respected by all 
member states and the willingness for improved legal practices of human rights was reflected in the 
domestic politics of the states, where national human rights institutions were set up.  
Signatories, reservations and denunciations  
The signing of the European Convention is a prerequisite for states to join the CoE and new member 
states are expected to ratify the Convention at the earliest opportunity
53
. The accession of the Eastern 
European states to the CoE left the ECtHR to integrate a substantial number of new member states into 
its institutional framework while monitoring human rights in legal systems that had only recently been 
developed
54
. While this was a challenge to the European system, the mandatory acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has, to a large extent, secured the independence of the ECtHR. 
The signing of the Convention has however not been a guarantee for a perfect compliance rate with the 
ECtHR rulings. 
While the signing of the Convention is mandatory to CoE member states, they are not required to sign 
the following Protocols. States may voluntarily decide to accept these documents and it appears that 
the Protocols come to be after careful deliberations between the member states as the majority of 
Protocols have been signed and ratified by all states. The only exception is Protocol 12
55
, the anti-
discrimination treaty of the Convention, which has not been signed nor ratified by ten states
56
. This, 
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however, has not had an influence on the functioning and the autonomy of the Court and therewith 
NGO participation. 
The European Convention provides for the possibility to “… make a reservation in respect of any 
particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law when in force in its territory is not in 
conformity with the provision”57. The Convention does not allow for reservation of a general 
character
58
 and when making a reservation, the state needs to provide the domestic law which is not 
compatible with the Convention. The purpose of the reservations under the European Convention is to 
be accommodating in respect to minor differences which otherwise may prevent a state from ratifying 
the Convention
59
. Convinced by the presupposition that the signing of the Convention was merely 
symbolic, the reservations made with the ratification of the European Convention were of a 
confirmative rather than a restrictive nature. The Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom 
supported the Convention by expanding it to their colonies and dependencies. The autonomy of the 
ECHR and the ECtHR has not been in question through the reservations made to the European 
Convention
60
.  
The European Convention allows for “… a High Contracting Party [to] denounce the present 
Convention”61 in case a state does no longer want to be bound by the rules of the ECtHR. Even though 
the member states have not always agreed on the procedures of the Court, and many have pressured 
for reforms, the European system has only faced a small number of threats of withdrawal and one 
actual denunciation. After being faced with a highly critical report, finding allegations of torture and 
ill-treatment to be factual, Greece decided to denounce the Convention
62
. The fear of being expelled 
from the CoE made Greece decide to forestall the events by withdrawing. However, Greece 
recognized the necessity of being a member of the CoE and rejoined the Convention in 1974. As 
Greece‟s denunciation occurred in the 1970s, when the global role of NGOs was still limited, the level 
of NGO participation is not representative of the difference in NGO participation that can be found 
among the regional human rights systems today.  
The threats of withdrawal have been more recent. The Tories in the United Kingdom (UK) have 
threatened to denounce the European Convention, stating that it is time for the UK to “quit the 
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jurisdiction” of a “supranational quango”63. They claim that the ECtHR has lost all democratic 
acceptability by crafting domestic laws for member states based on small cases brought forward by 
individuals, which undermines the sovereignty of the UK. A possible withdrawal would threaten the 
European Union (EU) membership of the UK, as membership of the CoE is a requirement for the 
member states of the EU. Furthermore, the exit of the UK would be an offense of the system, having a 
Court that gets more respect in Ukraine and Russia than in one of the most prominent European 
countries
64
. Thus far, the UK has not taken any steps towards an actual denunciation.  
The threats of the UK have been too recent to conclude with certainty that these threats have led to an 
increase in NGO participation. The course of action does however follow the hypothesis on the 
influence of autonomy on NGO participation. A noticeable increase can be found in the issuing of 
press releases from (European) human rights NGOs related to the ECtHR
65
. Even though it would be 
expected that these press releases would mainly concern the threats of the UK and therewith a call for 
their increased support, it is interestingly more a shift back of the attention of NGOs to the overall 
reform process of the Court. The threats of withdrawal of the UK have only reinvigorated the debates 
on the reforms of the system. The lack of pressure from NGOs to the UK to not withdraw from the 
European Convention reflects the fear of „hollow‟ ratification66 of the European Convention. The 
system thrives better if all states comply with the issued judgments. Pressure for ratification may result 
in states accepting the Convention for the wrong reasons
67
, which jeopardizes the likelihood that the 
state will comply with the provisions laid out.   
Compliance 
While the autonomy of the European Human Rights System has been largely uncontested over the last 
decades, the biggest threat to the autonomy of the European Human Rights System today comes from 
the poor compliance rate of some of the member states. After the Court judges on a case, the 
Committee of Ministers asks the state concerned to engage in a type of reparation: financial 
compensation to the victims; symbolic measures; retrials and holding perpetrators to account; and 
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general measures that changes policies and procedures
68
. During the first decades of its existence, the 
rate of compliance with the ECtHR rulings was high and its judgments were described as being “as 
effective as those of any domestic court”69. The Convention has been largely incorporated into 
domestic law in the member states
70
 and human rights standards in Europe have been substantially 
influenced by rulings of the ECtHR
71
. Prior to the accession of the Eastern European states, the 
compliance level in Europe was taken as an example for other regional systems
72
 and the levels of 
compliance among member states were fairly equal. However, the political climate of the CoE largely 
changed with the accession of the Eastern European states, therewith changing the compliance rate of 
the system. The ECtHR Annual Report of 2007
73
 shows that five member states – Russia, Turkey, 
Romania, Ukraine and Poland – account for 59% of the Court‟s caseload74. As many of these cases are 
considered to be repetitive and therefore inadmissible, it reflects the unsuccessful change of domestic 
policies and practices after previous ECtHR rulings. The compliance supervision executed by the 
Committee of Ministers of the CoE has in the previous decade only included Eastern European states 
and Turkey
75
. The domestic conditions of the member states that resulted in an almost perfect 
compliance rate in the beginning of the European system greatly differ from the states in which the 
rate of non-compliance is now problematic. Research conducted by Hillebrecht has shown that 
countries with few or weak democratic institutions and general suspicion of the ECtHR, tend to 
engage in à la carte compliance, choosing between different components of a ruling
76
. The overall 
compliance level of the ECtHR has worsened over the last decades.  
Russia has proven to be one of the major challengers to the independence of the ECtHR. In April 2014 
it threatened to pull out completely from the European Convention after being suspended from the 
Council of Europe over the crisis in Crimea. Alexander Pushkov stated that some European countries 
had adopted a “pathologically biased approach” and had threatened Russia in a condescending 
manner
77
, leaving Russia no choice but to consider the termination of the membership of the CoE. 
Over the last decades, Russia has repeatedly alleged the political institutions of the CoE to have an 
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anti-Russian bias, while the Court blames Russia for bogging it down with a disastrously high number 
of repeat petitions
78
. While Russia has complied comparatively well concerning financial reparations, 
its record concerning the implementation of general measures is much worse. This has resulted in the 
large number of repetitive petitions alleging the same abuses
79
.  
The poor compliance rate of some of the member states to the ECtHR has increased the participation 
of NGOs through the lobbying. In May 2011, a handbook was issued by Cali and Bruch, which 
focused on NGOs that aim to monitor the implementation of the judgments issued by the ECtHR
80
. 
This handbook shows the need for NGOs to closely monitor compliance and step in to provide 
assistance to states whose compliance rates are troubling. NGOs have been active in many CoE 
member states to pressure for reforms in areas that align with their interest, most actively in states with 
bad human rights records. In Russia, human rights NGOs have been of great importance to the 
domestic education on ECtHR case law and the citing of ECtHR case law in their rulings
81
. A group of 
NGOs took the UK to the ECtHR in 2014 concerning surveillance practices after their domestic 
pressure did not change the practices
82. However, as with the threat of UK‟s withdrawal, the focus of 
NGOs in the European system has largely been on the pressuring for reforms at the Court rather than 
support with the member states, in order to have a fully effective human rights system.  
Calls for Reform of the System 
Member states of the CoE have repeatedly called for reforms of the ECtHR in the last decades. The 
rapid growth of the number of individual complaints has put pressure on the Court that it has not been 
able to deal with, which has urged member states to pressure for reforms of the procedures of the 
Court. A first major step was taken with the implementation of Protocol 11. However, further reforms 
are required to ensure the efficiency of the system. This was recognized in 2005 with the creation of a 
Group of Wise Persons to investigate the long-term effectiveness of the control mechanism of the 
ECtHR
83
.  
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This increase in the requests for reform has provided opportunities for NGOs to participate at the court 
through lobbying for reform on behalf of and with the member states. Over the last years, NGOs have 
often urged states to take their fair share in the responsibility of the protection and promotion of 
human rights in Europe. While member states call for the reform of the ECtHR, the call of NGOs is 
rather towards the “…political will by the 47 member states of the CoE to respect the European 
Convention, to implement and ensure the implementation of the Court‟s judgments and to adequately 
resource the ECtHR and the Department of Execution of judgments”84. This statement touches upon 
the biggest challenges to the European Human Rights System: its compliance rate and a lack of 
resources. The proposal of the member states, which would limit the Court to a solely constitutional 
role
85
, has been heavily criticized by NGO, as this reform would serve to undermine the legitimacy 
and fundamental purpose of the Convention by limiting the right to issue individual complaints. In a 
joint statement of 156 NGOs in 2002, they argued for the Court to keep its adjudicative function in 
order to become maintain its efficiency
86
.  This joint statement shows the possibilities for NGOs to 
take up a different role in the reform process, primarily as the advocate of the individuals who the 
system is meant to serve. This form of participation is not specifically a result of the lack of autonomy 
of the institution, but rather an expression of the general interests and mandates of human rights 
NGOs.  
The other avenues for NGOs to influence the Court‟s reform process are fairly limited. Every two 
years, the President of the Court invites NGOs for a consultation in Strasbourg
87
. Thisbi-annual 
meeting has been followed by multiple meetings with NGOs, Court officials and member states‟ 
permanent representations to focus on specific issues. While these consultative meetings are helpful 
for NGOs to voice their concerns and discuss matters with Member State representatives, the real 
influence in the reform process is limited to the NGOs that have Observer States at the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights (CDDH). While the number of human rights NGOs has grown to over 
200 in the last decade, only three NGOs have the possibility to observe and participate in the 
deliberations about reform: Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the 
International Federation for Human Rights
88
. These NGOs do not have any decision making power, 
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but this status does provide them with the possibility to voice their opinion directly with the CDDH. 
The limited possibilities for other NGOs to participate in the reform process forces them to collaborate 
with one of the NGOs with Observer Status – this is often done through the issuing of joint statements 
which are then presented at the meetings. In the negotiation process of Protocol 12
89
, a group of ten 
human rights NGOs issued a joint statement. AIRE Center, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, the International Commission of Jurists and others gathered to express their concerns about the 
potential weakening of the system if the reform process were to be continued as it was initiated
90
. 
While these statements show that NGOs put great value on the adequate functioning of the ECtHR, the 
value of these statements is limited to the voicing of their concerns.  
The possibilities for NGOs to participate at the ECtHR related to a lack of autonomy are limited. 
While they do have the possibilities to voice their concerns in the reform process, their influence on 
the actual reforms is minimal. However, the NGOs have become of bigger importance to the domestic 
practices of member states related to compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR.  
Resources and NGO participation 
The ECtHR receives its budget from the CoE
91, which covers the judges‟ remuneration, staff salaries 
and operational expenditures. The overall CoE budget comes from the 47 member states, whose 
contributions are fixed according to scales which take into account the population and gross national 
product. The budget of the ECtHR is part of the general budget of the CoE and as such, it is subject to 
the approval of the Committee of Ministers
92
. The contributions of the EU to the European Joint 
Program will not be taken into consideration for the resources of the Court as it is funded directly to 
the CoE, which then allocates it towards the Court. Furthermore, the funds that the EU provides come 
from cooperation between the European institutions rather than a lack of resources.  
The protection and promotion of human rights is one of the main pillars of the CoE and that is 
reflected in the in its ratio budget. In 1989, the combined budget of the Court and the Commission 
represented 10% of the CoE budget, which was increased to 15,8% solely for the ECtHR in 2001
93
. 
The €217.017.900,-  budget of 2011-2012 was for nearly half allocated towards the protection and 
promotion of human rights, reflecting the dedication of the CoE member states to maintain the ECtHR 
to be an efficient institution. 
Even though the CoE allocates a large portion of its funds towards the ECtHR, more resources are 
required for the Court to remain efficient and deal with the backlog of cases. The budgetary 
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predicament facing the Court, and the CoE as a whole, remains a significant “stumbling block”94 and 
the Committee of Ministers has stated that “the current budgetary situation in Member States does not 
make it possible to increase the budget of the Organization”95. However, both member states and the 
Court have recognized the necessity to increase the budgets of the Court in order for it to function 
effectively. The yearly contribution of fifteen member states to the CoE does not even equal the annual 
costs of a judge, which are approximately €333.667,-96 - and they therefore do not contribute further to 
the functioning of the ECtHR. Moreover, every time the budget of the Court increases, money has 
often been transferred from the CoE Programs of Activity budget to the Court
97
, which has 
undermined the impact of the other activities of the CoE, including the human rights training 
programs.  
The growth of the budget over the last years has not been able to keep up with the increasing number 
of judgments that the Court has delivered. Over the last 50 years, the Court has delivered more than 
10.000 judgments, and the staff of the Registry has grown exponentially to be able to effectively and 
fairly investigate the allegations brought before the Court. In 1989, the Court employed 74 permanent 
positions, which has grown to 630 in 2010
98
.  Even though its staff has grown, the system is still 
challenged with finding the means to effectively manage the influx of cases. Currently, much of both 
the human and financial resources are taken up by the repetitive and imbalanced cases brought before 
the Court
99
. The quest for increased funding has led the ECtHR to ask member states for voluntary 
contributions to reform the institutional structures in order to deal with these challenges.  To instigate 
the member states to voluntarily contribute, the ECtHR has provided the states with the possibility to 
stipulate that they want their funds to be spent specifically on cases against them
100
. The contributions 
made by the member states will be “used where they will have the most effect, that is on the cases 
which have the most impact in terms of identifying and correcting serious human rights abuses 
throughout the Council of Europe countries”101. The voluntary contributions to the ECtHR will not 
address the wider budgetary predicaments facing the Court, as they are not constant and to be 
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depended on yearly. They will only be used to help reduce the number of pending cases
102
. This has 
been, combined with reforms concerning the possibilities for individual applications, seemingly 
effective
103
. The voluntary contributions to the ECtHR may only come from member states which 
leaves little possibilities for NGOs to provide direct monetary assistance. 
Another avenue for NGOs to participate is by providing assistance in investigations. This can be done 
both on-site in member states that are suspected to be violating human rights and in cases that have 
already been brought before the court by individuals. The ECtHR relies to a great extent on its 
member states to address human rights violations and does therefore not have as extensive of an 
investigative procedure as the IACHR. Additionally, the required investigations for the cases that are 
brought before the Court are kept to a minimum, due to the fact that the ECtHR heavily trusts the 
judgments of its member states. Before a complaint can be filed at the Court, all domestic remedies 
must have been exhausted – the national courts thus have to have investigated the abuses and must 
have established all the facts to the case. The Court appreciates and trusts the European legal system
104
 
and is therefore left to evaluate the facts that have already been thoroughly investigated domestically. 
The level of autonomy is clearly reflected here: the relationship between the ECtHR and its member 
states is reciprocal. Since the member states respect the independence of the Court, the Court more 
easily accepts the judgments of the member states. This reciprocal relationship however limits the 
possibilities for NGOs to provide assistance to the Court. Since NGOs often follow cases of grave 
violations from the beginning of the complaint-filing process
105
, their knowledge and information in 
investigations is more likely required to be able to determine whether the facts of the case are straight. 
If NGOs suspect that national courts have deficiently established the facts of the case, they can decide 
to intervene and warn the court
106
.  
The limited role for NGOs in assisting in investigations is also reflected in the number of amicus 
curiae briefs that are filed at the ECtHR. Amicus briefs often reiterate facets of international law that 
the lawyers at the court are already familiar with. Additionally, it often only serves as a symbolic 
representation of the various positions on controversial topics such as abortion and euthanasia. They 
are therefore only occasionally regarded as helpful
107
 and are usually only requested upon when a 
comparative law study is required for the Court to judge on a case. The last request for a study was 
done by the ECtHR to Liberty, when it asked to conduct a comparative law study on the European 
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laws concerning transgender
108
 - a controversial topic concerning a new legal system which the 
registry lawyers were unfamiliar with. The comparative law studies are conducted at the request of the 
Court and are therefore not increased by the lack of funding of the institution.  
Possibilities for Legal Aid 
Another avenue for NGOs to be involved is to represent victims at the ECtHR. This is dependent on 
the possibilities for legal aid provided at the Court
109
. The European Human Rights System has early 
on recognized the necessity for the provision of legal aid to those individuals that do not have the 
financial resources to file a complaint. The European Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial in 
both civil and criminal proceedings
110
, which has been interpreted as providing for a general 
requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual in the case111. 
To be able to guarantee this, the Resolution on Legal Aid
112
 was adopted, which incorporated a budget 
for legal representation into the budget of the CoE. With the introduction of this budget, the 
representation of NGOs was no longer needed to help individuals finance the costs of litigation. The 
numbers of NGO representation confirm this: of the over 10.000 cases that have been ruled on from 
2000-2009, only 305 had an NGO as representative
113
. The less than one percent of the cases where 
NGOs represent an individual shows that this is not an avenue that is heavily utilized by NGOs in 
Europe.  
Even though there have been calls for reform of the budget of the Court because of the backlog of 
cases, the allocation of the resources has allowed to Court to continue to carry out its own 
investigative and legal legwork. The financial difficulties facing the ECtHR appear to not have an 
influence on the possibilities for NGO participation. NGOs have not been able to provide any direct 
monetary assistance, their assistance in investigations is not required as the system allocates enough 
budgets for the ECtHR to do so itself, and the legal assistance fund of the ECtHR functions well 
enough for NGOs to not have to represent victims at the Court. Due to the general beliefs of member 
states that they are the main protectors of human rights in Europe, the support of NGOs has not been 
asked for. 
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The Inter-American Human Rights System 
In 1948, during the Ninth International Conference on American States, the members of the Pan 
American Union adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (“American 
Declaration”)114, the first of two major instruments that protect and define human rights principles 
among the American States. The American Declaration created the IACHR and functions as a default 
instrument that can be applied to the states that are not party to the American Convention on Human 
Rights (“American Convention”)115. The second of the two instruments, the American Convention, 
was adopted in 1969 and created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) which has 
jurisdiction over the member states concerning the respect for human rights. To this day, the Inter-
American system continues to have this two-part structure.  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The IACHR has a quasi-judicial and promotional mandate. It was established primarily as a 
consultative organ to promote and defend human rights by creating awareness, making 
recommendations to member states on domestic legislation, preparing reports, and conducting on-site 
investigations
116
. Initially, the possibilities for individuals to file a complaint with the IACHR were 
limited. In 1965, the statute was amended which empowered the IACHR to receive and process 
individual complaints alleging human rights violations
117
. The right of petition now extends to any 
individual, group of individuals, or non-governmental entity within an OAS member state
118
. The 
conditions for filing a complaint are that all domestic remedies must be exhausted
119
, the petitioner 
must observe a strict time limit to file the complaint
120
, and must avoid duplication of procedures
121
.  
Under the American Convention, the Commission has an obligation to encourage the involved parties 
to reach a friendly settlement
122
. If a friendly settlement cannot be reached, the IACHR can refer the 
case to the Court. However, for the Commission to refer a case to the Court, the member state in 
question needs to be party to the American Convention and it must have accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court. While individuals can file a complaint with the Commission if the member state is not party 
to the Convention, its options are limited if a friendly settlement cannot be reached as it cannot be 
referred to the Court.  
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The main functions of the IACtHR are adjudicatory and advisory, aiming to interpret and apply the 
provisions that are laid out in the American Convention. The advisory function of the IACtHR allows 
the Court to respond to consultations which have been submitted by the agencies and the member 
states of the OAS regarding the interpretation of the American Convention
123
. Furthermore, it allows 
the Court to give advice on domestic laws and legislation to be able to clarify whether or not these are 
compatible with the provisions of the Convention. While the judiciary function of the Court is limited 
to the states that have ratified the Convention and that have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court, 
the advisory function of the IACtHR is available to all OAS member states
124
.  
NGO Participation in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
The OAS has recognized civil society and NGOs as key participants to reach its mandated goals
125
. 
Through dialogue, NGOs play an active role in contributing ideas and recommendations to the 
institutions. The OAS has established funds for the participation of civil society in some OAS 
activities such as the General Assembly (GA) and Permanent Council, but this has neither included the 
IACtHR nor the IACHR
126
.  
There are more possibilities for NGOs to formally participate in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System than at the ECtHR. Foremost, they are able to lodge a complaint: “any person or group of 
persons, or any non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states”127 can file a 
petition with the IACHR. The person filing the petition at the Inter-American Court does not need to 
be the victim of the violation; instead, a claim may be filed on behalf of any specific victim. A NGO 
filing a complaint only needs to be organized in one member state and not even in the member state 
where the alleged violation took place – the petition only needs to meet certain threshold requirements, 
including the exhaustion of domestic remedies
128
. NGOs can serve as a representative of other 
petitioners before the IACHR as well. If the case is then referred to the IACtHR, the NGO remain the 
representative. The Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR permit the submission of pleaders, motions, and 
evidence by not only the alleged victims but also their authorized representatives
129
.  
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As the cases at the Court are dependent on what the Commission refers to it, the possibilities for 
NGOs to participate at the IACtHR are limited. One of the ways in which NGOs participate is through 
the filing of amicus curiae briefs. Neither the American Convention nor the Statute of the Inter-
American Court and its Rules of Procedure have expressly provided for the filing of the briefs, neither 
mentioning nor ignoring them
130
.  
Autonomy and NGO Participation 
Contrary to the European Human Rights System, not all member states to the OAS are party to the 
American Convention and thus bound by the jurisdiction of the Court. This has posed challenges to 
the autonomy of the human rights system. As the American Declaration and the American are two 
separate documents which are not simultaneously signed by the OAS member states, some states may 
be subject to only one of the institutions. The OAS consists of 34 member states, of which 23 have 
signed and ratified the American Convention
131
. The jurisdiction of the Court has to be explicitly 
accepted by the states, which has been done by 20. The competence of the Commission is 
automatically recognized by the states upon the signing of the Convention
132
.   
Signatories, reservations and denunciations 
There are three levels of acceptance within the Inter-American Human Rights System: (1) universal 
acceptance for all the member states of the OAS, under which people enjoy the protection of the rights 
recognized in both the American Declaration and the Charter of the OAS; (2) acceptance of the 
member states that have ratified the Convention but not recognized the jurisdiction of the Court; and 
(3) the member states that have ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court
133
. 
There are only nine states that have accepted all the tools that the Inter-American system has to offer: 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Panama and Venezuela
134
. The 
most controversial non-ratifiers are the United States and Canada, which is condemned by multiple 
NGOs
135
, which has led them to actively lobby with the governments of both states to ratify the 
American Convention.   
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The non-ratification of the U.S. and Canada has not only increased NGO participation domestically 
but it has also triggered the criticizing of the procedures and practices of the IACHR by other member 
states. There have been claims that the IACHR has acted as a tool for modern U.S. imperialism and as 
a U.S. contrivance
136
, taking too progressive of a stand. It has furthermore been argued that the 
diplomatic support of the Inter-American human rights institutions is inadequate: 80% of the OAS 
budget is supplied by two states that are not a party to the Convention
137
.  They financially dominate 
the human rights system while at the same time refusing to submit to the same level of scrutiny. This 
has led to an internal bloc of states – the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)138 - to 
repeatedly speak out on the lack of balanced support
139
 due to the non-universal ratification. Following 
the persistent criticism of member states, one of the priorities of the OAS in the reform process of the 
Inter-American Human Rights System has been the advancement of the universalization of the 
ratification of the American Convention. This particular position has triggered the participation of 
NGOs in the reform process, calling not to implement universal ratification
140
. Research has shown 
that the mere ratification of a human rights treaty does not lead to better human rights practices
141
, 
which would lead to states only enjoying the benefits related to the acceptance of the Convention
142
 
without adhering to the provisions. This could jeopardize the mandate of the American Convention as 
it may not have the effect of protecting the human rights in the American states and NGOs therefore 
argue not to implement universal ratification.  
The American Convention allows for member states to make reservations. The reservation made needs 
to be in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
143
, which was 
more clearly established in the advisory opinion issued by the IACtHR
144
. The fairly liberal approach 
towards reservations has led to the adoption of a number of reservations, which all in principle have 
the effect of limiting the extent of particular rights
145
. Many of the reservations made have touched 
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upon the integrity of the system
146
, which has undermined its autonomy. As the reservations were 
adopted at the time of the ratifications, which was mostly done in the 1970s and 1980s, NGOs have 
not directly participated in the process of the adoption of the reservations. Over the last decades the 
reservations specifically related to the right to life, and correspondingly the death penalty, have 
triggered NGO participation
147
. As the reservations are legal under the American Convention, the 
efforts of the NGOs have been mainly focused on domestic lobbying for the retraction of the 
reservations
148
.  
The American Convention also provides for the option of withdrawal. States may denounce the 
Convention at the expiration of a five-year period from the date of its entry into force and with a one 
year notice
149
. The 1981 request of Peru to have the withdrawal take effect immediately confirmed that 
direct effect would undermine the integrity of the institutions and is therefore not possible
150
.  While 
the European and Inter-American system do not differ on the institutional provisions on denunciations, 
the Inter-American system has been faced with more. Of the original 28 signatories to the American 
Convention, three states have withdrawn. Additionally, many have threatened to do so.  The most 
recent serious threat occurred in 2011, when the IACHR issued interim measures concerning the 
construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project in Brazil. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs called the recommendations “precipitous and unwarranted” and the Brazilian President in turn 
ordered an immediate cessation of all relations with the IACHR – recalling its ambassador from the 
OAS and withholding its financial contributions
151
. The Brazilian response to the measures made the 
Commission back down: it modified its decision and asked Brazil to implement measures to protect 
the human rights involved in the construction of the dam
152
. The Commission‟s decision to soften the 
measures negatively affected the level of respect it received from the member states: it was viewed to 
have overreached at first after which it had to back down. The participation of NGOs related to this 
threat are mainly apparent in the early stage of the investigations of the IACHR, which were initiated 
by the issuing of an NGO report
153
.  
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The first country to suspend its ratification was Trinidad and Tobago on May 26, 1998, providing the 
reason that the government considered the waiting time for death row inmates to be cruel and unusual 
punishment. Their proposal to speed up the process of death trial was prohibited under the American 
Convention and the government therefore decided to withdraw from the Convention in order to be 
able to determine its own course of action
154
. The most recent denunciation occurred in November 
2014, when the Dominican Republic strongly responded against a IACtHR ruling concerning the 
discrimination of residents of Haitian descend in the country. The Dominican government claimed the 
ruling to be unconstitutional and called the allegations “out of season, biased and inappropriate”155 and 
decided to withdraw from the Convention.  
Even though the act of denunciating from a human rights convention is a threat to the effectiveness of 
the system, the 2013 Venezuelan government withdrawal was somewhat of a different nature. Rather 
than having its denunciation follow a disagreement with the direct findings of the IACHR or the 
judgments of the IACtHR, the government used its denunciation as a statement of protest concerning 
the lack of reforms. Venezuela has been repeatedly criticized for its human rights records, which 
includes the reports in Chapter IV
156
 of the IACHR Annual Reports. President Chavez has persistently 
called to reform the system by limiting the authority because the IACHR and IACtHR had distanced 
themselves from the “sacred principles they are called upon to protect”157. The lack of a, in the eyes of 
Venezuela, proper response led the government to denounce. Since its denunciation, its human rights 
record has worsened
158
. The other ALBA countries have also taken issue with rulings by the Court and 
Commission that they have found to be unfavorable, leading them to threaten to withdraw from the 
Convention if the IACHR is not reformed
159
. The Venezuelan denunciation has triggered the 
participation of NGOs in the reform process in the last decade
160
. 
The Venezuelan denunciation is characteristic for the reform process of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System. Many of the proposed reforms by states are aimed at limiting the criticism they 
receive, therewith protecting the domestic practices. In the process of the drafting of the American 
Convention, some states were already aware of the possibility that states could bond together to 
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destroy the oversight bodies. A safety mechanism was therefore established: reforms to the statute of 
the Commission were only to be accepted by the GA of the OAS if the proposal would come directly 
from the IACHR
161
. The reform process of the last decades has however shown that countries have 
sidestepped this mechanism by backing their claims based on state sovereignty
162
 - currently the 
system is faced with these threats from the ALBA countries
163
. The lack of integrity in the reform 
process has also been recognized by Human Rights Watch. It has issued a letter to the OAS GA in 
which it aimed to answer why its own member states had launched a campaign against the 
organization. The Americas division argues that “… it has touched the interests of the important 
governments that possess clear autocratic tendencies or are sufficiently powerful as to believe that they 
are entitled not to render accounts to a supervisory body”164. This is, inter alia, reflected in the efforts 
of the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, who has aimed to restrict the work of specifically the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression after being criticized on its policies regarding the 
freedom of expression
165
. Additionally, the ALBA countries have attempted to eliminate the voluntary 
contributions that the IACHR now receives, jeopardizing the budget and effectiveness of the 
Commission
166
.  
Compliance 
The neglect of most OAS member states towards the development of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System in its initial stages has led the system to develop in an independent manner
167
, lacking a 
persuasive enforcement mechanism. The poor compliance record of the system has been influenced by 
the failure of the political organs of the OAS to adequately support the human rights institutions
168
.  
The system has been faced with significant challenges concerning the compliance with the judgments 
issued by the institutions: in 2009, only 12,5% of the rulings of the IACHR were fully complied with 
by the member states
169
. The compliance rate of the IACtHR has been relatively better: to date, 221 
cases have been ruled on by the IACtHR, of which 114 have been complied with
170
. 
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Colombia is one of the states with the worst compliance records concerning controversial topics such 
as forced disappearances.  While the state has a relatively good compliance rate concerning the easier 
mandates such as financial reparations, it has failed to comply with the executive rulings concerning 
the adaption of its domestic human rights laws
171
. Another state that has shown few incentives to 
pursue compliance with the rulings of both the IACHR and the IACtHR is Brazil
172
. It appears to lack 
the political will to implement any changes to its domestic policies and practices. The overall 
challenge to the compliance with the rulings of the institutions can to some extent be ascribed to the 
lack of an enforcement control mechanism as the ECtHR does have. The IACtHR can inform the GA 
of the OAS about non-compliance, but the chances of punishment are slim as it acts by consensus
173
. 
The low compliance rate has led the human rights NGOs to more actively lobby on behalf of the Court 
to change domestic practices
174
. This is successfully reflected in the case of the Argentinian amnesty 
laws. The laws of the state were not in conformity with the judgments issued by the IACtHR and since 
there is no sanctioning mechanism to enforce the rulings, the Argentinian government saw no need to 
change its laws. Regional as well as international human rights bodies have criticized and lobbied for 
the elimination of the amnesty laws concerning human rights violations, with success in Argentina in 
2005 when previous laws were declared unconstitutional
175
. Human Rights Watch stated, after striking 
down the laws, that “…no matter how many years go by, laws that block justice for gross abuses of 
human rights remain a thorn in the side of democratic governments”176, thus leaving opportunities for 
NGOs to actively lobby.  
The effects of the lack of respect for the institutions is clearly reflected in the acceptance of the 
IACHR‟s attempts to use its right to have in loco visits to assess the human rights situation in member 
states. Up until the 1990s, the main mechanism for the IACHR to report on the human rights practices 
of the member states was the publication of Country Reports. However, these were often not accepted 
by the member states: many of the states against which specific cases were opened did not 
participation in the litigation. They did not respond to the complaint, did not provide any comments on 
the draft of the reports and failed to present any evidence to deny charges
177
 . In the instances in which 
the Commission was able to produce a report, responses have been overwhelmingly negative.  
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The 1978 Commission Report on the human rights situation in Nicaragua was responded to by the 
government with the statement that “[it] does not correspond to the reality of Nicaragua”178 and the 
government assumed presupposed political positions. The 2002 Report on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Venezuela was not accepted by the Venezuelan government. The Commission had 
unsuccessfully requested the consent of the government to visit the country again to observe the 
current situation, but the government has explicitly not permitted a second visit “until all [of the 
Commission] rectifies its biased position towards it [Venezuela]”179. This has limited the possibilities 
for the IACHR to conduct investigative research and the reluctance of member state cooperation has 
led the Commission to turn to hearings rather than on-site visits to assess the human rights situation.  
While the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan responses to the report are fairly extreme, the responses to the 
Country Reports often involve smaller obstructions such as the failure to provide necessary 
information. The responses to the 2006 Bolivian Report has shown repeated requests by the 
government for the extension of deadlines
180
, the Mexican responses to the 2011 report have shown to 
be patently inadequate in terms of preventing and redressing crimes
181
, and the IACHR decided to visit 
Honduras in 2010 without its approval after the worsening of the human rights situation
182
. Often, in 
order to maintain a good international status, governments express the willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation, which is not followed by an actual improvement of the human rights practices.  
The reluctance to accept the Country Reports issued by the IACHR does not only come from the 
member states which are targeted in the reports. There is a general reluctance among all member states 
and the political institutions of the OAS. The General Assembly rarely ever discusses the reports, in 
order to avoid disagreements with its member states
183
.  Additionally, the Annual Reports of the 
IACHR are supposed to be collectively evaluated in order to produce a careful analysis of the progress 
of the Inter-American Human Rights System. However, the historical tension between the member 
states and the Commission created misunderstanding and mistrust on both sides which jeopardizes the 
effectiveness of these meetings
184
.  
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NGOs have become increasingly important for the issuing of the Country Reports. This is indirectly 
influenced by the lack of autonomy and the unwillingness of member states to cooperate in the 
investigative procedures. However, it is directly influenced by the lack of resources to the IACHR. 
The participation of NGOs in this area will therefore be discussed in the analysis of the resources of 
the institutions.  
Calls for Reform of the System 
The persistent lack of autonomy has initiated a reform process that has been ongoing over the last 
decades. This has created opportunities for NGOs to participate, advocating both on behalf of the 
institutions and the member states. One of the major possibilities for NGOs to participate in the reform 
process is through public consultations. The consultative procedure on the reform of the Rules of 
Procedure of the IACHR has led to more than 100 NGOs providing comments
185
. The fall 2003 
Consultation Procedure was followed by a joint recommendation of eleven NGOs, which has been an 
effective way for NGOs to let their voices be heard
186
. In January 2012, following the OAS Permanent 
Council‟s approval of the recommendations of the Working Group187, more than 90 NGOs signed a 
communiqué in which they voiced their opinions regarding the recommendations, urging for a 
dialogue to discuss them
188
. This was followed by a public hearing which was scheduled by the 
IACHR. The repetitious issuing of joint statements on all reform issues reflects that the influence of 
the documents issued by NGOs extends farther than in the European system, where the decision-
making process is shielded to only the Court and the member states. 
The mistrust between the IACHR and its Contracting Parties has not only initiated NGOs to lobby for 
institutional reforms, but it has also triggered NGOs to step in and provide assistance to individuals in 
order for them to be able to effectively utilize the protection mechanism. In 1991, a former director of 
Americas Watch created the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) to exclusively take 
cases before the IACHR. Employing a strong intervention strategy, it has grown to be the 
representative in approximately 60% of the cases in which NGOs have represented individuals that 
have brought a case before the Commission
189
. Additionally, CEJIL has been of great importance for 
the reform process of the Court. As its mandate extends to the training and dissemination of lawyers 
and the strengthening of the Human Rights System, CEJIL has issued, up to this date, ten position 
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papers on specific issues concerning the reform of both the IACtHR and the IACHR
190
. The detailed 
analyses provided on the functioning of the institutions have been of great importance to the Working 
Group concerned with the reforms
191
. 
The autonomy of the Inter-American Human Rights System has been challenged since its creation. 
The dual document structure of the system has created difficulties for the OAS to have all member 
states to dedicate themselves to the system. The lack of respect for the independence of the institutions 
has created many opportunities for NGOs to participate – roles which they have actively filled. NGOs 
have actively lobbied within the Inter-American System, both with member states for greater respect 
and with the institutions for reforms, and they have been active in filing amicus curiae briefs.   
Resources and NGO Participation 
The funds of both the IACtHR and the IACHR are determined in the budget of the OAS
192
. The 
finances of the human rights institutions have been a struggle since their creation. This has caused 
them to heavily rely on Specific Funds over the last years, which are open to contributions from any 
source or country
193
.  While the Specific Funds do allow for extra funds to the workings of the IACHR 
and IACtHR, these funds cannot be counted on each year. This has caused great distortions in the 
financing schemes of the institutions and creating difficulty in making mid- and long-term plans
194
.  
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The initial establishment of the Court was not supported by any budgets from the OAS, which forced 
the judges to write the Rules of the Court, hire the staff and arrange a headquarters themselves
195
. The 
current budget of the Court provides it with the minimum resources that it needs to function, which 
restricts the IACtHR to provide any additional services to both member states and complainants
196
. In 
2000, the Court proposed that it would need at least €1.739.700,- in order to adequately function, 
rather than the €1.100.000,- it received197 – a significant increase. The increase of the funds of the 
Court were waited upon until 2003, when the budget of the Court was raised by 37%,. However, even 
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though the budgets have increased over the last decade, the current budget provided by the OAS 
covers only 47% of the total required resources
198
. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The biggest challenge to the budget of the IACHR has been the rapid growth of its workload. The 
increase of cases is reflected in its annual reports: the 1989-1990 report was 195 long
199
, while the 
1998
200
 report already contained three volumes, a total of 1600 pages. Simultaneously, more personnel 
was hired to the IACHR, adding eight lawyers and four administrative employees to the staff
201
. The 
increase of the workload and therewith the personnel has forced the IACHR to spend over two-thirds 
of the €3.000.000,- it receives on the salaries of its employees202. This has left little money for its 
investigative mandate.  The budget has increased from €1.114.900,- 2005 to €2.444.500,-  in 2010203, 
which has provided some relief for the finances of the IACHR. However, it still continues to depend 
on external funds. The current budget provided by the OAS provides for only 55% of the 
expenditures
204
. 
While the European Human Rights System only allows for voluntary contributions from its member 
states in order to preserve the independence of the system, the Inter-American account is open to any 
source. One of the most important requirements for the external funding of the IACHR is that it needs 
to be supplied by foundations and NGOs whose support will not threaten the independence of the 
Commission
205
 . In 2011, the external funds of the IACHR added to over €4.000.000,-, which it 
received from twelve states and five major human rights NGOs
206
. Save the Children and SOS 
Children‟s Villages together financed over 10% of the voluntary contributions of that year207. A large 
portion of the external funds of the IACHR goes towards on-site visits
208
, which makes a contribution 
to these funds a simple yet crucial avenue for NGOs to provide direct monetary assistance and to be 
indirectly involved in the IACHR investigations.  
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In its Annual Report of 2011, the IACHR has set up priority areas which should receive more 
resources if its funds were to increase. One of the main priorities is the budget allocated towards the 
on-site observations
209
. Over the last decades, the priorities of the Commission have been forced to 
shift towards the examination of individual complaints, rather than the investigation of gross human 
rights violations
210
. The investigatory mandate of the IACHR has been undermined by the lack of 
resources and the increase in the budget has not had an impact on the resources available for the 
investigations and on-site visits of the Commission, as the member states determined that the increase 
of the budget should be for other purposes
211
. Since the first visit in 1961, the Commission has 
employed 93 in-loco visits
212
, of which only 11 have been conducted from 2000-2011. This is a 
decrease from the decade before, when on average four on-site visits were conducted per year. 
However, the requests for on-site visits have not correspondingly declined. The initiation of country 
visits comes from individual petitions that the IACHR receives
213
, and the number of these petitions 
have increased by 170 percent from 1997-2003
214
. The shift of focus of the IACHR has allowed for 
NGOs to step in and provide operational assistance through conducting research, as the limited 
number of investigations has also negatively influenced the issuing of Country Reports. 
Since the 1970s, Amnesty International and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) have 
been of great importance to the IACHR
215
. They have approached the Commission with extensive 
documentation of human rights abuses occurring in Latin America. The annual country reports that 
have been issued by these NGOs have been a major asset for the IACHR in conducting investigative 
legwork
216
. Additionally, Commissioners have increasingly placed representatives of human rights 
NGOs on investigative teams to support the arrangement of interviews and to conduct fact-finding
217
. 
The knowledge of Commissioners often does not extend to the specificity of knowledge required for 
the investigation of the human rights abuses. The appointment of a NGO representative to the 
investigative team is a low-cost solution to gain the required knowledge. This has become a fairly easy 
way for NGOs to be involved in the processes of the IACHR.  
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In order to gather the information required to monitor the human rights situation in all member states, 
the IACHR has extended its annual questionnaire from only being issued to its member states to 
including civil society in 2003
218
. In order to provide an overview of the most problematic areas of 
human rights in the Western hemisphere, the IACHR started in the 1980s to issue these questionnaires 
to its member states. The questions are mainly related to the compliance of states with the 
recommendations of the Commission, the decision of the Court and the overall human rights standards 
of the system
219
. These questionnaires are found to be important for the initial stages of investigations, 
in which either individuals or NGOs report on human rights abuses. This is then followed by the 
initiation of investigations by the Commission. In the initial stages of the IACHR, it was capable of 
providing information on these violations itself, but due to the lack of resources it has become to rely 
on individuals and NGOs to report these violations. The inclusion of NGOs in this early stage of the 
process shows that the Commission needs external support in order to adequately function
220
 and be 
able to carry out its investigative mandate.  
Possibilities for Legal Aid 
The Inter-American System provides a Legal Assistance Fund for individuals that file a complaint. 
However, for the victim to be able to apply to the fund, the case must have been referred to the 
IACtHR. As many cases filed to the IACHR strand at the Commission, the availability of financial aid 
is fairly limited. Once a case has been submitted to the Court, any victim may expressly request access 
to the fund but there is no legal aid available for complaints issued at the IACHR. Furthermore, it 
often only covers aspects of the participation, as “the legal assistance benefit shall be granted on 
condition of available resources”221. Currently, the fund runs by voluntary contributions from Norway, 
Colombia and Denmark
222
. The lack of financial aid at the Commission results in costs of bringing a 
case before the IACHR still being too high for the majority of those the system is meant to serve
223
. 
The costs of a simple case, not involving more than one victim and one violation, are estimated at 
€119.400,-224, which is unaffordable to many. The limited accessibility to financial aid jeopardizes the 
integrity of the system and the credibility of the member states as they are unwilling to provide an 
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effective system in which complaints can be filed against them. Currently, NGOS have become the 
actor to give meaning to the possibilities for victims of human rights abuses.  
The representation of victims by NGOs differs greatly from the role played at the ECtHR. Currently, 
NGOs in the Inter-American Human Rights System take the responsibility of providing representation, 
training and advice to victims of human rights abuses. This is clearly reflected in the numbers on NGO 
representation: of the cases that have been judged on at the IACHR from 2000-2009, over 50% had a 
NGO to represent the individual at the Commission
225
. At the Court, the representation of NGOs 
extended to over 60%
226
.The current lack of accessibility to the system for individuals jeopardizes the 
integrity of the system and there have been calls by both member states and NGOs for reform
227
. The 
Legal Assistance fund needs to be broadened to cover more of the expenses and it needs to have a 
regular budget, as it is now dependent on the voluntary contribution of three states alone.  
The resources of the Inter-American System have had, similarly to its autonomy, an effect on the 
participation of NGOs. They have provided direct monetary assistance, have proven to be a critical 
asset to the investigations and they have often been the representative of individuals due to the lack of 
an efficient legal aid system.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to answer the following research question: What explains the variation 
across the European and Inter-American Human Rights Systems as to the participation of NGOs? 
After examining previously conducted research by constructivist scholars and legal scholarship, it was 
concluded that there is no theory available to explain the variation. This research therefore followed 
the assumption that institutional structures are an important indicator to NGO participation. Both 
regional human rights systems are most-similar in their design and mostly differ in their level of 
autonomy and their level of resources. The following two hypotheses have been tested:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: The lack of autonomy of a regional human rights institution leads to more NGO 
participation in the form of lobbying for reform or lobbying for greater support 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The lack of funding for the human rights institutions leads to more NGO 
participation through the provision of investigative and monetary assistance 
The findings of this research confirm the first hypothesis. It was first of all established that the 
autonomy of the European Human Rights System is much stronger than that of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System. The European autonomy has been challenged by recent threats of withdrawal 
and poor compliance records of some member states, but its overall level of autonomy secures the 
independence of the ECtHR.  NGOs were found to be limitedly participating in the roles that were 
linked to the level of autonomy: lobbying for greater support, lobbying for reform of the institutions, 
providing assistance in investigations and the filing of amicus curiae briefs. The influence of NGOs in 
the European system has been limited to voicing their concerns in the reform process, fact-finding in 
cases brought before the ECtHR in which the facts have been deficiently established, and the 
pressuring for increased support with member states with poor compliance records.  
The first hypothesis is further confirmed by the Inter-American System: its independence has been 
more heavily contested and this has led to more NGO participation. The system been confronted with 
many reservations to the Convention, a number of threats of withdrawal, three official denunciations, 
and a poor overall compliance record. This is reflected in the possibilities for NGOs: they play an 
important role in the reform process of the system and due to the mistrust between the IACHR and the 
Contracting Parties, NGOs provide assistance in the investigations that are instigated against the 
member states. Furthermore, they have deliberately lobbied with the member states of the OAS to 
retract their reservations and they have actively lobbied for the implementation of IACtHR and 
IACHR judgments into domestic laws.   
The hypothesis on the resources of the institutions is not as clearly confirmed by the findings of this 
research. The Inter-American Human Rights System is undoubtedly struggling with the lack of 
resources to adequately function which has created many opportunities for NGOs. The OAS has not 
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been able to effectively address the financial challenge which has jeopardized the system. NGOs have 
stepped in to provide assistance on many levels. Because the Specific Funds of the IACHR and 
IACtHR are open to any source, NGOs have been able to provide direct monetary assistance.  
Moreover, NGOs are of vital interest for the IACHR to conduct on-site visits and produce Country 
Reports as the funds of the IACHR are no longer sufficient to carry out its investigative mandate. 
Additionally, NGOs have on many occasions taken the opportunity to inform the IACHR and IACtHR 
on the facts of laws through the filing of amicus curiae briefs.   
The second hypothesis is not confirmed with the findings on the European Human Rights System. 
Even though the majority of the budget of the CoE goes towards the protection and promotion of 
human rights, the ECtHR requires more resources to deal with the massive influx of its workload. The 
ECtHR‟s funds have been sufficient enough to conduct investigative legwork, which leaves limited 
NGO participation through this avenue. However, the ECtHR remains to have a large backlog of 
cases. The increase in funds over the last decades has proven to be effective, but it still has to deal with 
over 100.000 backlog cases. While the Inter-American Human Rights System has allowed NGOs to 
provide the resources and assistance, the member states of the CoE remain determined to preserve the 
independence of the Court by aiming to provide these resources themselves. The challenge to the 
funds is an issue that the CoE constantly addressing and it continues to find new ways to release funds 
to the ECtHR. The possibilities for NGOs will most likely not grow until the CoE has exhausted all its 
remedies. The European System however does not confirm that a lack of resources leads to more NGO 
participation. 
In order to be able to convincingly determine what explains the variation in NGO participation, further 
research is required. This research has been limited to three participatory roles due to pragmatic 
reasons, and has moreover been limited to the data provided by the institutions and NGOs. A better 
and more stable image can be provided if more personal interviews can be conducted with human 
rights NGO representatives who can elaborate on the motives and possibilities of NGOs to participate. 
Furthermore, as can be seen with the level of resources, the domestic conditions and preferences of the 
member states have an influence on the level of resources and autonomy. To be able to form a 
complete picture on what factors influence the participation of NGOs, the domestic circumstances 
need to be more closely examined. Not only would further research provide a clearer picture of the 
participation of NGOs, it may influence the practices of NGOs as a better image will be provided on 
their possibilities, which may make their work more efficient. However, what has been confirmed by 
this research is that the weaknesses of the institutions are an important indicator to the participation of 
NGOs. In the Inter-American System, both institutional structures are weak and the system requires 
more external support. The European System places great value on the integrity of the system and 
keeps its own member states responsible for its functioning.  
